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Abstract
We develop a tractable model of out-of-equilibrium dynamics in a general equilibrium
economy with cash-in-advance constraints. The dynamics emerge from local interactions
between firms governed by the production network underlying the economy. We
analytically characterise the influence of network structure on the propagation of
monetary shocks. In the long run, the model converges to general equilibrium and the
quantity theory of money holds. In the short run, monetary shocks propagate upstream
via nominal demand changes and downstream via real supply changes. Lags in the
evolution of supply and demand at the micro level can give rise to arbitrary dynamics
of the distribution of prices. Our model explains the long standing Price Puzzle: a
temporary rise in the price level in response to monetary contractions. The Price Puzzle
emerges under two assumptions about downstream firms: they are disproportionally
a ected by monetary contractions and they account for a su ciently small share of the
wage bill. Empirical evidence supports the two assumptions for the US economy. Our
model calibrated to the US economy using a data set of more than fifty thousand firms
generates the empirically observed magnitude of the price level rise after monetary
contractions.
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1 Introduction
A basic implication of the quantitative theory of money is that monetary contractions
induce a decrease in the price level. However, numerous empirical studies report monetary
contractions generate a temporary increase in the price-level. This “price puzzle” is sizeable:
a monetary contraction that generates a 0.1% decrease in the price-level in three years is
capable of generating a 0.1% increase in three months (Rusnak et al., 2013, Table 4). The
sizeable wrong directional movement in the price-level is significant because the price-level
mediates the relation between money and output in theoretical models of monetary neutrality
(Lucas, 1972; Ball and Mankiw, 1994). Within sticky-price and sticky-information models of
monetary neutrality, a wrong directional change in the price-level implies a counterfactual
relation between money and output (Mankiw and Reis, 2002). The Price Puzzle is therefore
empirically sizeable and theoretically significant.
This paper argues that the price puzzle emerges from the out-of-equilibrium propagation
of monetary shocks through the production network of the economy. The propagation of
monetary shocks generate di erential and time-varying responses in the supply and demand
for consumer goods. The price puzzle emerges if monetary shocks have a strong short-
term impact on the supply and a weak short-term impact on the demand of consumption
goods. Two conditions prove su cient to induce these dynamics: downstream firms must be
disproportionally a ected by monetary contractions and they must account for a su ciently
small share of the wage bill. Both conditions find empirical support. Also, our model
calibrated to the US economy generates the empirically observed magnitude of the wrong
directional movement in the price-level following a moonetary contraction.
Our approach builds on Acemoglu et al.’s (2012) model of the network origins of aggregate
fluctuations. We consider an economy with a representative consumer and a finite number of
firms with Cobb-Douglas production functions. The production network of the economy is
identified with the weights of these Cobb-Douglas functions. We introduce two novel elements
in this framework. First, we study out-of-equilibrium dynamics in which prices are set locally
by firms. Second, motivated by the empirical observation that firms’ liquidity can be binding
and theoretical insights on the macro-economic implications of these constraints (Grossman
and Weiss, 1982; Stiglitz, 1988; Aghion et al., 2012), we study firms with cash-in-advance
constraints as in Lucas and Stokey (1985). These assumptions together make the out-of-
equilibrium dynamics tractable by generating linear dynamics in money balances. In the long
run, the quantity theory of money holds as the model converges to the general equilibrium
pertaining to the underlying primitives. In the short run, monetary disequilibrium propagates
upstream via nominal demand changes and downstream via real supply changes.
Monetary shocks take the form of heterogeneous lump-sum transfers of money (Levine,
1991; Molico, 2006; Anthonisen, 2013). We investigate the impact of monetary shocks on
the demand and supply for consumer goods in the course of out-of-equilibrium dynamics
generated by the shocks. The demand for consumer goods comes from a representative
household. The supply for consumer goods comes from a subset of firms. We define the price
level as a weighted mean of the price of consumer goods. A monetary contraction a ects
both the demand and the supply of consumer goods but through di erent mechanisms and
with di erent time lags. On the demand side, firms hurt by the initial impact and subsequent
propagation of a monetary contraction decrease wages. The decrease in wages decreases the
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household’s income and therefore the demand for consumer goods. The time necessary for a
monetary contraction to generate the long run decrease in nominal demand for consumer
goods depends on the topology of the production network and the distribution of labor
among firms. On the supply side, firms hurt by a monetary contraction and its propagation
temporarily decrease their output as their inputs are bid away by competing users. This
decrease in output propagates downstream through the production network1.
In the long run, monetary contractions have no e ect on the real demand and supply of
consumer goods as the economy reaches a new equilibrium with a lower price level. Our model
generates long run neutrality of money with respect to all real variables. But it generates
short run non-neutrality as the propagation of monetary contractions generates a temporary
increase in the price level. We analytically characterise two conditions under which the model
generates a wrong directional change in the price level. The first condition is firms hurt by
monetary contractions are su ciently downstream. This condition guarantees that monetary
contractions generate a decrease in the supply of consumer goods. The second condition is
firms hurt by monetary contractions bear a su ciently small share of the economy’s wage
bill. This condition guarantees that monetary contractions take su cient time to generate
the long run decrease in the nominal demand for consumer goods.
Theory and data support the two aforementioned conditions. The first condition follows
from the joint observation that downstream firms are disproportionately small and small
firms are disproportionately hurt by monetary contractions. The share of small firms in
basket of consumer goods is more than twice their share in the economy. Small firms not
only have a disproportionately high role in the production of consumer goods, they are also
more hurt by monetary contractions (Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994; Gaiotti and Generale, 2002;
Iyer et al., 2013; Carbo´-Valverde et al., 2016). One reason small firms are more hurt by
monetary contractions is their inability to substitute external finance with internal funds
(Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1993; Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997; Clementi and Hopenhayn, 2006).
Overall, there exist empirical and theoretical reasons which explain the temporary decrease
in the supply of consumer goods in response to monetary contractions. Our second condition
emphasizes that nominal demand decreases slowly because small firms which bear the brunt
of the initial impact of monetary contractions account for a limited portion of the economy’s
wage bill. Firms with annual receipts of less than one million account for less than 8% of
the wage bill in the US economy. Therefore the initial impact of a monetary contraction
generates a limited decrease in wages. Studies on household behavior also suggest that in
the short run demand for consumption goods decreases less than proportionally to changes
in income (Hall, 1978; Altonji and Siow, 1987; Jappelli and Pistaferri, 2010). Though our
model does not incorporate consumption smoothening, it is an additional reason why the
decrease in final demand is slow in the short run.
We investigate the empirical validity of the model by calibrating it on the US production
network using a novel data set with more than 100,000 buyer-seller relations between more
than 50,000 US firms including all major publicly listed firms. We use Monte Carlo methods
to study the dynamics of the calibrated synthetic economy with computational experiments.
1A collorollary of the argument is that a monetary contraction can increase the supply of consumer goods
if firms most hurt by the shock are su ciently upstream. When firms far upstream are hurt by a monetary
contraction, downstream firms purchase more of the inputs used by both sets of firms by outbidding upstream
firms. This allows downstream firms to expand the output of consumer goods.
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In the experiments, the initial impact of monetary shock scales sublinearly with firm size:
small firms are disproportionately hurt by contractions. The model calibrated to the US
production network robustly reproduces the empirically observed magnitude of the increase
in price level after monetary contractions.
1.1 Related literature
While the phrase “Price Puzzle” was coined by Eichenbaum’s (1992), the empirical phenomena
marked by the phrase was first noted by Thomas Tooke more than a century and a half ago.
The wrong directional movement in the price level which Eichenbaum called the Price Puzzle
has been found in a number of economies including Australia, France, Germany, India, Italy,
Japan, United Kingdom, and the United States (Sims, 1992; Gaiotti and Secchi, 2006; Mishra
and Mishra, 2012; Bishop and Tulip, 2017). Sims and Eichenbaum’s statement of the problem
generated a flurry of empirical work that attempted to identify variables whose inclusion
in VAR models would eliminate the price puzzle. Some suggested variables pertaining to
commodity prices and the private information with central banks may help resolve the Puzzle.
These variables have had limited success. More specifically, the methods which dampen or
eliminate the Price Puzzle in some periods, do not do so for others (Demiralp et al., 2014).
For instance, Barakchian and Crowe (2013) find the methods which generate right directional
price level changes through the mid-1990s, generate wrong directional price level changes
when estimated over later samples (particularly in the first year after monetary shocks).
The problem is so pervasive that some economists have had to allow control variables in
VAR models to take di erent coe cients for di erent subsample periods (Jorda and Taylor,
Forthcoming). Rusnak et al. (2013) present a meta analysis of the empirical literature on the
subject. They find that about 50% of modern studies find a temporary rise in the price level
following a monetary contraction after controlling for a variety of variables. Similarly, Ramey
(2016, p. 36) finds most models of monetary policy shocks “are plagued by the Price Puzzle
to greater or lesser degree” (see Table 3.1 in her paper).
As Sims (1992, p. 975) noted long ago, the tendency of a monetary contraction to predict
high inflation is hard “to reconcile with e ective monetary policy”. Numerous economists
therefore attempted to develop theoretical explanations of the Price Puzzle. Most expla-
nations fall within one of three groups: “common factors hypothesis”, “reverse causation
hypothesis”, and the “cost channel hypothesis”. The common factors hypothesis states price
level increase and monetary contraction are driven by common factors (Brown and Santoni,
1987). The common factors are typically estimated using econometric techniques with little
theoretical motivation (Bernanke et al., 2005). The empirical performance of the common
factors hypothesis is mixed. In a meta analysis of empirical studies on the Price Puzzle,
Rusnak et al. (2013) find that eight of eleven estimates using factor augmented VAR exhibit
the Price Puzzle.
The reverse causation hypothesis states present monetary contraction is caused by future
increase in the price level (Brissimis and Magginas, 2006; Barakchian and Crowe, 2013; Cloyne
and Hu¨rtgen, 2016). More specifically, present monetary contraction is a consequence of a
policy decision based on an expectation of a future increase in the price level. Thapar (2008)
however finds the Price Puzzle to be present even after conditioning for the information
4
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set of central banks. And Hanson (2004) finds no correlation between a variable’s ability
to forecast inflation and its ability to resolve the Price Puzzle. Ramey (2016) re-estimates
several models to control for all information available to the Federal Reserve. Her estimates
show that the wrong directional movement in the price level does not dampen due to the
expansion of the information set, in fact it increases the price puzzle. The reverse causation
hypothesis therefore finds limited empirical support.
The cost channel explanation of the Price Puzzle was first proposed by Thomas Tooke.
He argued that an increase in the interest rate increases the cost of production and therefore
the price level. Barth III and Ramey (2001) present a model of the cost channel explanation.
One of the problems with the cost channel explanation is that it involves an inadmissible use
of ceteris paribus conditions. An exogenous increase in the cost of one factor of production
will necessarily decrease expenditures on other factors of production, thereby generating a
decrease in some prices: this follows from the equation of exchange (Laidler, 1991). Prima
facia there is little reason to believe the prices which increase through the cost-channel are
disproportionately represented in the Consumer Price Index and Personal Consumption
Expenditure Index. This is why Wicksell (1935, p. 182-184) thought “Tooke’s thesis is
certainly wrong”. Our explanation of the Price Puzzle refines the cost channel mechanism so
as to resolve Wicksell’s criticism. Our theory is consistent with Wicksell’s (1958) assertion
that rise in prices of some goods will be compensated for by the fall in prices of other goods
in so far as neither the quantity nor the velocity of money change. Furthermore, since a
negative monetary shocks entails a decrease in the quantity of money, the rise in prices
of some goods must be more than compensated for by the fall in prices of other goods.
Our theory presents an explanation for why those goods whose prices rise happen to be
disproportionately represented in basket of consumer goods.
In resolving the Price Puzzle, we show price dynamics are intimately related to the size
distribution of firms within the production network. Our emphasis on firm size distribu-
tion echoes Gabaix’s (2011) claim that the granular structure of an economy plays a role
in generating macroeconomic phenomena. In essence we formalise a novel mechanism for
generating monetary non-neutrality: the percolation of monetary shocks through the produc-
tion network. Our paper is therefore thematically akin to recent work on ‘micro to macro
via production networks’ (Carvalho and Tahbaz-Salehi, 2018). Over the years economists
developed numerous monetary transmission mechanisms2. Few however made the production
network the focal point of analysis, with the notable exception of Cantillon (1755), Mises
(1953), and Friedman (1961). Among contemporary contributions, Nakamura and Steinsson
(2010) and Paston et al. (2018) show intermediate inputs amplify the impact of monetary
shocks. Anthonisen (2010) formalises monetary dynamics on production networks using an
overlapping generations model. And Mandel et al. (2019) study price dynamics on production
networks using an agent-based computational model. Ozdagli and Weber (2017) present the
only notable empirical measure of the role of production network in transmitting monetary
2Monetary transmission mechanisms include money illusion (Shafir and Tversky, 1997; Fehr and Tyran,
2001), the presence of a small number of price-wage setters (Soskice and Iversen, 2000), asyncrhonized price
setting (Caplin and Spulber, 1987), slow dissemination of information about the state of the economy (Lucas,
1972; Mankiw and Reis, 2002), the institutional structure of the banking system (Saving, 1973), transactions
costs (Rotemberg, 1984), incomplete asset markets (Gottardi, 1994), inflexible labor contracts (Cooper, 1988),
and di erences in beliefs about the price level (King, 1982; Chwe, 1999).
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shocks. They attribute 50-85% of the real e ect of monetary shocks to propagation through
the production network. Preliminary empirical evidence therefore suggests the production
network is a significant transmission mechanism.
One of the principle contributions of this paper is that we analytically characterize the
out-of-equilibrium dynamics which emerge from asymmetric initial impact of monetary shocks.
In this sense our work combines recent work on networks with older work on non-Walrasian
monetary economics (Lucas and Woodford, 1993; Eden, 1993). Numerous economists before
us have developed models in which non-neutralities emerge from asymmetric injections
(Scheinkman and Weiss, 1986; Fuerst, 1992; Christiano and Eichenbaum, 1995; Alvarez et al.,
2002; Williamson, 2008). Most models of asymmetric injections however assume agents
rebalance their money holdings by accessing Walrasian markets (Berentsen et al., 2005).
Within our model agents readjust their money balances using decentralised out-of-equilibrium
trades. The number of trades necessary for all agents to readjust their real money balances is
an endogenous variable which depends on the second Eigenvalue of the production network.
In other words, the time it takes for the economy to reach a new equilibrium after a monetary
shock depends on the second of eigenvalue the production network.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section
3 analytically characterizes the propagation of monetary shocks in the model and states
su cient conditions for the price level to increase after a monetary contraction. Section 4
presents the results of simulations performed with the model calibrated to granular data
on more than 100,000 buyer-seller relations between more than 50,000 US firms. Section 5
concludes the paper. Proofs are in the Appendix.
2 Model
2.1 The general equilibrium framework
We consider a general equilibrium economy as in Acemoglu et al. (2012) with a finite number
of firms and a representative household. The firms and the di erentiated goods they produce
are indexed by M = {1, · · · ,n}. The household has index 0 and N = {0, · · · ,n} denotes the
set of agents. The representative household inelastically supplies ⁄0 units of labor and has a
Cobb-Douglas utility function of the form:
u(x1, · · · ,xn) :=
Ÿ
jœM
x
aj,0
i (1)
where for all j œ M, aj,0 œ R+ is the share of good j in the household’s consumption
expenditures, thus qjœM aj,0 = 1.
Each firm i œM has a Cobb-Douglas production function of the form
fi(x0, · · · ,xn) := ⁄i
Ÿ
jœN
x
aj,i
j (2)
where ⁄i œR++ is a productivity parameter. For all j œM, aj,i œR+ is the share of good j in
firm i’s consumption expenditures, thus qjœN aj,i = 1 and there are constant return to scale.
We assume each firm uses a non-zero quantity of labor in its production process, i.e. for all
6
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i œM, a0,i > 0. The production structure is a network with adjacency matrix A= (ai,j)i,jœN
where ai,j > 0 if and only if agent i is a supplier of agent j and |ai,j | measures the share of
good i in the production costs of j. The network economy is denoted by E(A,⁄) and satisfies
the following assumption.
Assumption 1. The adjacency matrix of the production network A is irreducible and aperi-
odic.
The adjacency matrix A is irreducible if there exists a path between every two nodes in
the network, i.e. for every i, j œN, there exists tœN such that Ati,j > 0. An irreducible matrix
is aperiodic if there is no period in the length of cycles around any node, i.e. the greatest
common divisor of {k œ N | ÷i œNAki,i > 0} is 1. In our setting, mild su cient conditions for
irreducibility and aperiodicity can be expressed in terms of the relationship between firms
and the representative household. Given that each firm uses some labor in its production
process, the matrix is irreducible if each good enters the supply chain of at least one good
consumed by the household (the production of a good not satisfying this condition would be
zero at equilibrium). The matrix is aperiodic if at least one firm uses another good as an
input in its production process, i.e. if it is not the case that all firms produce using labor
only. To sum up, Assumption 1 holds in all but degenerate cases. The standard notion of
general equilibrium can then be defined as follows for the network economy E(A,⁄).
Definition 1. A collection (pi,xi, qi)iœN œ RN+ ◊ (RN+ )N ◊RN+ of prices, intermediary con-
sumption vectors and outputs is a general equilibrium of E(A,⁄) if and only if:
’i œM, qi = ⁄i
Ÿ
jœN
x
aj,i
i,j and q0 = ⁄0 feasibility (3)
’i, j œN, xi,j := aj,ipiqi
pj
profit and utility maximization (4)
’i œN, ÿ
jœN
xj,i = qi market clearing (5)
This definition is standard but for the fact that the condition for profit and utility
maximization have been expressed directly through first order conditions. It also accounts
for the fact that profit at equilibrium is zero given there are constant returns to scale. Under
Assumption 1, there exists a unique general equilibrium in the economy.
Proposition 1. Up to price normalization, the economy E(A,⁄) has a unique equilibrium
(pi,xi, qi)iœN œ RN+ ◊ (RN+ )N ◊RN+ , which moreover satisfies:
’i œM, pi =
1
⁄i
Ÿ
jœN
(
pj
aj,i
)aj,i . (6)
Using the normalization p0 = 1, this can also be written as:
log(p) = (I≠AÕ|M )≠1“ (7)
where AÕ denotes the transpose of A, AÕ|M its restriction to M and for all i œM, “i :=
≠ log(⁄i)≠qjœMaj,i log(aj,i).
7
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2.2 Out of equilibrium dynamics
Building on Gualdi and Mandel (2016), we introduce a simple discrete-time model of out-
of-equilibrium dynamics in the network economy E(A,⁄) in order to study the short-term
e ects of monetary shocks on prices. The defining characteristic of our approach is that we
model local decision making of firms without a central signal about prices or quantities. This
implies agents must use a decentralized mechanism to make decisions about prices they set,
combinations of inputs they demand, and quantities of output they produce.
Agents must hold money balances in order to engage in decentralized trades. We assume
each agent i œ N initially holds a certain money balance m0i œ R+ and denote by mti the
monetary balance of agent i in period t œN. The money balances of the household correspond
to its consumption budget. The money balances of a firm can be thought of as its working
capital or as a credit line extended by funders. Each firm i œM initially holds a certain
stock of output q0i œ R+. More generally, let qti œ R+ denote firm i’s stock of output at the
beginning of period t. The household supplies a constant quantity of labor qt0 = ⁄0 every
period. We study the dynamics of prices, quantities, and money balances which emerge from
such a setting.
With Cobb-Douglas production technologies the optimal allocation of the working capital
of a firm among intermediary inputs is independent of the prices of inputs. More specifically,
given working capital mti firm i’s nominal demand to agent j œN is equal to aj,imti. Simi-
larly, the representative household’s optimal nominal demand to agent j is aj,0mt0 because
preferences are Cobb Douglas. Thus total nominal demand faced by agent j is qiœN aj,imti.
For sake of parsimony and to remain as close as possible to the conventional equilibrium
framework, as a first approximation we assume prices are fully flexible and thus each agent
j œN sets its price in period t to:
ptj =
q
iœN aj,imti
qtj
(8)
This has two implications. First, firms sell their complete stock of output every period and
thus do not carry inventories. Second, the intermediary consumption of good j by firm i in
period t, xti,j œ R+ is given by:
xti,j =
aj,imti
ptj
(9)
Hence, the production and the stock of output available next period is:
qt+1i = fi(xti) (10)
Finally, each firm i must determine the share of revenues to carry over as working capital to
next period. The nominal demand is a` priori inelastic because preferences and technologies
are Cobb-Douglas. Within this setting, it is reasonable to assume firms are myopic, i.e.
they expect nominal demand to remain unchanged. These expectations prove correct in a
stationary state (see Proposition 2 below). Furthermore, the choice of the amount of working
capital for next period implicitly corresponds to the choice of the profit rate. Consider a
firm that receives a nominal demand m œ R+ in a period and uses a share µ œ [0,1] of the
8
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revenues as working capital for next period, while distributing the rest as a dividend to the
representative household who owns the firm. If nominal demand is indeed stationary, the
profit of the firm is m≠µm and the profit rate is (1≠µ). Since we do not explicitly model
the entry and exit of firms, the profit rate cannot be determined endogenously. For sake
of simplicity and to ensure consistency with the general-equilibrium framework, we assume
firms enter as long as the profit rate is non-zero and thus set µ= 13. Hence, the dynamics of
money balances are given by:
mt+1i =
ÿ
jœM
ai,jm
t
j (11)
Equations (8) to (11) define a dynamical system on RN+ ◊RN+ ◊ (RN+ )N ◊RN+ , which
define the trajectories of prices (pti)tœNiœN , intermediary and final consumptions (xti)tœNiœN , output
(qti)tœNiœN and money balances (mti)tœNiœN in the network economy E(A,⁄). This dynamical system
has good properties of convergence towards equilibrium. The dynamics of prices can be
characterized by the following lemma:
Lemma 1. In the dynamical system defined by Equations (8) to (11), for all t œ N and for
all i œM :
pt+1i =
1
⁄i
mt+2i
mti
Ÿ
iœN
A
ptj
aj,i
Baj,i
(12)
or equivalently:
log(pt+1i ) = log(p0i )+
tÿ
·=0
ÿ
jœN
A·j,i log
Qamt+2≠·j
mt≠·j
Rb (13)
This lemma highlights the fact that price dynamics are eventually determined by monetary
dynamics. Given that monetary dynamics are themselves linear according to Equation (11),
we use standard results from the theory of Markov chains to show the convergence of our
system to general equilibrium. Namely, one has:
Proposition 2. The only globally asymptotically stable state of the dynamical system defined
by equations (8) to (11) is the element (mi,pi,xi, qi)iœN œRN+ ◊RN+ ◊ (RN+ )N ◊RN+ such that:
m= Am (14)
(p,x,q) is a general equilibrium of E(A,⁄) (15)ÿ
jœM
pjqj =
ÿ
jœM
mj . (16)
Moreover, there exists Ÿ œ R+ such that for all m0 œ RN , one has:
Îmt≠mÎ Æ Ÿﬂˆt (17)
where ﬂˆ is the second largest eigenvalue of A.
3Considering µ < 1 would not qualitatively change the structure of the model nor our results about price
dynamics. The notion of equilibrium would however slightly deviate from the conventional one (see Gualdi
and Mandel, 2016).
9
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In the absence of exogenous shocks, the out-of-equilibrium dynamics introduced above
converges to the general equilibrium of the network economy E(A,⁄). The level of prices is
completely determined by the monetary mass in circulation. And in equilibrium the revenue
of a firm is proportional to its eigenvector centrality (Equation 14). The speed of convergence
and thus the very notion of the long-run depends on the structure of the network through
the second largest eigenvalue4.
3 Impacts of a monetary shock
In this section, we theoretically study the impact of exogenous monetary shocks on price
dynamics. The model does not contain an explicit representation of the financial system
to maintain parsimony. It is however reasonable to think the working capital of a firm
corresponds to some form of external funding sensitive to monetary policy shocks. And
therefore one can represent the impact of a negative monetary shock as a contraction of the
working capital of the firms. We therefore see firms as credit constrained a` la Greenwald and
Stiglitz (1993).
More formally, we consider an economy E(⁄,A) that is initially at an equilibrium
(m0i ,p0i ,x0i , q0i ) := (mi,pi,xi, qi). The economy faces a monetary shock at the end of period 0.
This shock is represented by a vector ‘ œ RN such that for all i œN the working capital of
agent i is shifted to mi+ ‘i. Shocks have heterogenous impacts at the micro-economic level.
More specifically, ‘i/‘j ”= mi/mj where either ‘ œ RN+ or ‘ œ RN≠ . The long-term behavior of the
economy following the shock is completely determined by proposition 2. Namely:
Corollary 1. An economy at the equilibrium (mi,pi,xi, qi)œRN+ ◊RN+ ◊ (RN+ )N ◊RN+ subject
to a monetary shock ‘ œ RN converges, for the dynamical system defined by equations (8) to
(11) to the new equilibrium (mˆi, pˆi,xi, qi) œ RN+ ◊RN+ ◊ (RN+ )N ◊RN+ such that for all i œM :
mˆi = (1+ ÿ)mi and pˆi = (1+ ÿ)pi (18)
where ÿ=
q
iœN ‘iq
iœNmi
.
Hence in the long-run the quantitative theory of money holds: prices adjust exactly to the
quantity of money in circulation. Our principle question is however the short run dynamics
of prices following a monetary shock. What drives the short run dynamics of prices is the
heterogeneity of shocks at the micro-level. It is straightforward to check using Equation 8 that
if shocks are homogeneous, i.e. if for all i, j œN ‘i/‘j = mi/mj, prices adjust instantaneously
to their new equilibrium values. Non-trivial dynamics materialize only if the initial impact of
monetary shocks is heterogeneous.
4As stated in Golub and Jackson (2012), the second largest eigenvalue captures the extent to which a
matrix can be separated into two blocks with relatively little interaction across the blocks. For example,
within our setting convergence would be much slower in a system formed by ‘two economies linked by few
import-export relationships’ than in a ‘closed and completely integrated economy’.
10
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3.1 Introductory Example
We consider the circular economy introduced in Figure 1 to highlight the e ects at play when
the initial impact of monetary shocks is heterogeneous. Within the circular economy the
consumer assigns the same consumption budget to each firm and each firm uses a share 1/2 of
labor in its production process. Furthermore, each firm has a single supplier and a single
buyer among firms. We assume the productivity parameter is such that ⁄i = 2 for each firm.
The household supplies n units of labor.
F1
F2
F3
F4
Fn
C0
A=
Qccccccccccca
0 1/2 . . . . . . . . . 1/2
1/n 0 . . . . . . . . . 1/2
... 1/2 . . . 0
... 0 . . . . . . ...
... ... . . . . . . 0 ...
1/n 0 0 0 1/2 0
Rdddddddddddb
Figure 1: A circular economy with n firms, F1, · · ·Fn and a consumer C0. The consumer
assigns the same consumption budget to each firm, each firm uses a share 1/2 of labor in
its production process, has a single supplier and a single buyer among firms. Links are
directed from suppliers towards buyers. Thick lines correspond to weights of 1/2 thin lines
correspond to weights of 1/n. The matrix A is the adjacency matrix of the network where the
first line (resp. column) corresponds to the revenues (resp. expenses) of the household and
the subsequent lines (resp. columns) to these of the firms.
In this framework, assuming total monetary mass is 3n, it is clear that at equilibrium all
prices are equal to 1, each firm holds 2 units of working capital, produces 2 units of output
using 1 unit of labor and 1 unit of input from its supplier whereas the household holds n
units of wealth and consumes 1 unit of every good. That is, the equilibrium distribution of
wealth, output and prices are given by the following table.
agent 0 1 2 3 · · · n
m n 2 2 2 2 2
q n 2 2 2 2 2
p 1 1 1 1 1 1
Suppose firm 1 receives a positive monetary shock of 2‘ > 0 at the end of period 0. The
induced change in demand for firm 1 leads to the following state in stage 1.
agent 0 1 2 3 · · · n
m1 n 2+2‘ 2 2 2 2
q1 n 2 2 2 2 2
p1 1+ ‘/n 1 1+ ‘/2 1 1 1
m2 n+ ‘ 2 2+ ‘ 2 2 2
11
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Following the shock, firm 1 increases its demand to firm 2 and the household. This raises
the price of labor and of firm 2’s output. For firm 1 the rise in labor price is more than
compensated by its increase in working capital. Firm 1 thus increases its output. For the
other firms the rise in the price of labor induces a decrease in output. The state at t= 2 is
given by:
agent 0 1 2 3 · · · n
m2 n+ ‘ 2 2+ ‘ 2 2 2
q2 n 2
ıˆıÙ (1+ ‘)2
(1+ ‘/n)(1+ ‘/2) 2
Û
1
1+ ‘/n 2
Û
1
1+ ‘/n 2
Û
1
1+ ‘/n 2
Û
1
1+ ‘/n
p2 1+ ‘/2n 2+
‘/n
2
ıˆıÙ (1+ ‘)2
(1+ ‘/n)(1+ ‘/2)
2+ ‘/n
2
Û
1
1+ ‘/n
2+ ‘/2+ ‘/n
2
Û
1
1+ ‘/n
2+ ‘/n
2
Û
1
1+ ‘/n
2+ ‘/n
2
Û
1
1+ ‘/n
m3 n+ ‘/2 2+ ‘/n 2+ ‘/n 2+ ‘/2+ ‘/n 2+ ‘/n 2+ ‘/n
The increase in nominal demand triggered by the initial shock at this stage is mainly
concentrated on firm 3 and on the household. This implies firm 3 has to increase price given
output has not increased. Furthermore, the nominal demand faced by firm 1 is decoupled
from the increase in its output. Therefore, firm 1 has to decrease its price. Thus a positive
monetary shock can induce both increase and decrease of prices in the short-run.
To simplify analysis, we assume n is large and discard the terms ‘/n. This simplifies the
expression of the state in stage 2 to:
agent 0 1 2 3 · · · n
m2 n+ ‘ 2 2+ ‘ 2 2 2
q2 n 2
ıˆıÙ (1+ ‘)2
(1+ ‘/2) 2 2 2 2
p2 1
Û
1+ ‘/2
(1+ ‘)2 1 1+
‘/4 1 1
m3 n+ ‘/2 2 2 2+ ‘/2 2 2
The shock propagates further through two e ects on production. Firm 2 increases its
output because of the increase in nominal demand it faced. Firm n increases its output
because of the decrease in the price of the input it buys from firm 1. This leads to the
following state in stage 3 (neglecting terms of order ‘/n):
agent 0 1 2 3 4 · · · n
m3 n+ ‘/2 2 2 2+ ‘/2 2 2 2
q3 n 2 2
ıˆıÙ(1+ ‘/2)2
(1+ ‘/4) 2 2 2 2(
(1+ ‘)2
1+ ‘/2 )
1/4
p3 1 1
Û
1+ ‘/4
(1+ ‘/2)2 1 1+
‘/8 1 ( 1+
‘/2
(1+ ‘)2 )
1/4
m4 n+ ‘/4 2 2 2 2+ ‘/4 2 2
12
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As for firm 1 in stage 2, the increase of output by firms 2 and n is not matched by corresponding
increase in demand. Both firms thus decrease prices.
In the following periods, the sequence of events “positive demand shock, increase of output,
decrease in price, increase in output” propagates further. However, the size of the shock
decays progressively each period as a part of the shock is absorbed by the household who
redistributes demand uniformly among firms (through the term ‘/n neglected in our analysis).
Eventually, the shock is evenly distributed among firms generating a general rise in prices by
a factor of 1+ 2‘/3n.
3.2 Network structure and transmission of shocks
The above example shows that the impact of a monetary shock can be ambiguous in the
short run. For example, a positive monetary shock can induce both increase and decrease in
prices in the short run. The temporary volatility in prices generated by a monetary shock
propagates across the network through two channels. One, a direct channel whereby the
monetary shock induces a change in demand for inputs. Two, an indirect channel whereby
firms respond to changes in the prices of inputs.
More generally, the short-term dynamics of prices is related to the network structure
as follows. From equation 11, we have mt = At(m0+ ‘) = Atm0+At‘ = m0+At‘. Using
Equation (13) we can completely characterize the dynamics of prices following a monetary
shock by the structure of the supply network. First, for t= 2, for all i œN :
log(p2i ) = log(p0i )+ log
A
m3i
m1i
B
+
ÿ
kœN
Ak,i log
A
m2k
m0k
B
(19)
= log(p0i )+ log
A
m0i +A3i,·‘
m0i +Ai,·‘
B
+
ÿ
kœN
Ak,i log
Qam0k+A2k,·‘
m0k
Rb (20)
Equation (20) su ces to illustrate the main drivers of price dynamics. The primitive cause
of the variation of prices is the non-uniform speed of propagation of monetary shocks across
the network. The shocks get propagated through walks of di erent lengths in the network
and thus reach a given node with di erent lags. This implies firms might experience changes
in the nominal demand they face as highlighted by terms of the form mt+2k /mtk. The changes
in nominal demand has a direct impact on prices corresponding to the term log
1
m3i/m1i
2
in
Equation (19). The direct channel induces a rate of change of prices that is proportional
to the rate of change of nominal demands. This direct impact propagates upstream in the
network: from buyers to sellers. The changes in nominal demand also has an indirect impact
represented by the term qkœN Ak,i log1m2k/m0k2 , which corresponds to the feedback e ect on
a firm from the changes in the prices of inputs induced by the direct demand e ect. This
indirect e ect is mediated by the fact that changes in prices of the suppliers a ects the
production level of the firm and thus its price. The indirect e ect propagates downstream in
the network: from sellers to buyers.
More generally, the relation between price dynamics, network structure and shocks is
13
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given by:
log(pt+1i )≠ log(p0i ) =
t≠1ÿ
·=0
ÿ
kœN
A·k,i log
Qa m0k+At+2≠·k,· ‘
m0k+ ›{·<t}At≠·k,· ‘
Rb (21)
where › denotes the indicator function.
A linear expansion of this expression highlights the relative role of upstream and down-
stream propagation mechanisms. Namely, denoting by log(pt)œRN the column vector formed
by the log(pti) and by AÕ the transpose of A, one has:
Proposition 3. For small enough monetary shocks ‘, the dynamics of prices can be approxi-
mated as:
log(pt+1)≠ log(p0) =
tÿ
·=0
(AÕ)· mAt≠· (A2≠ I)‘+(AÕ)t m‘ (22)
where  m is the diagonal matrix whose coe cients are the (m0k)kœN .
In line with the preceding discussion, equation (22) highlights the fact that the primitive
driver of the dynamics is the volatility in nominal demand induced by the initial shock. This is
represented by the term (A2≠ I)‘ corresponding to the di erences between the direct impact
of the shock ‘ and its impact after a two period lag A2‘. The two period lag corresponds to
the di erence between the time where production decisions are made and the time at which
firms are confronted with demand. This lag in the propagation of shocks creates a mismatch
between supply and demand which is resorbed by a deviation of prices from their equilibrium
values. The size of this initial deviation (A2≠ I)‘ is determined by the local structure of the
network. More precisely, it depends on the incoming degree of order two i.e. the weights of
incoming paths of length two. The initial price deviation is likely to be small if the network
is homogeneous and the distribution of two-degrees is centred around average (equal to one).
If a node has a large incoming degree of order two i.e. it is a large indirect supplier of the
economy, it is likely to initially react in an unconventional manner to a monetary shock.
For example, the firm may decrease its price following a positive monetary shock (indeed
A2i,·‘≠ ‘i is likely to be positive if ‘ œ RN+ ). Conversely, a node with small incoming degree of
order two is likely to initially exacerbate the e ect of a monetary shock. This role of second
order interconnectivity is reminiscent of the results in Acemoglu et al. (2012).
This initial volatility is then propagated in the network. The propagation is represented
by the linear operator qt·=0(AÕ)· mAt≠· . The operator corresponds to the combination of
upstream/forward and downstream/backward propagation channels identified above. The
term At≠· corresponds to the upstream propagation of the variation of demand and of the
correlated variation of price from a firm to its suppliers. The term (AÕ)· corresponds to the
propagation of the feedback e ect induced by the price variation of a firm on the price of
its buyers through changes in production costs. Hence the term (AÕ)·At≠· (A2≠ I)‘ can be
interpreted as the propagation of the shock (A2≠ I)‘ for t≠ · steps in the upstream/forward
direction and then for · steps in the downstream/backward direction. In other words, the
shock propagates through demand e ects for t≠ · steps via At≠· and through price e ects
for · steps via (AÕ)· . More formally, (AÕ)·At≠· is the matrix of weights of walks of length
n whose t≠ · first steps are in the direction of the edges of the network and whose · last
14
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steps are in the opposite direction. The factor  m corresponds to the scaling of the shock
proportionally to the initial monetary holdings. The operatorqt·=0(AÕ)· mAt≠· corresponds
(up to the rescaling factor  m) to the total weights of walks of length t in the network when
allowing for both forward and backward propagation. To sum up, the log-variation of price
at the end of period t+1, log(pt+1)≠ log(p0), corresponds to the propagation of the initial
shock (A2≠ I)‘ through the network in both forward and backward directions. The term
(AÕ)t m‘ is a corrective term accounting for the fact that there is no variation of prices in
period 0 to be propagated backwards.
Remark 1. The propagation operator is very similar to the matrix of weights of walks
of length t upon which the computation of feedback centrality mesures is based (see e.g.
Bonacich, 1987; Jackson, 2010). Explicitly, if one discards the rescaling factor  m, one hasqt
·=0(AÕ)·At≠· = (A+AÕ)t, which corresponds to the matrix with the walks of length t for the
adjacency matrix A˜ := A+AÕ of the undirected network obtained by discarding the direction
of links in A. Thus, up to the rescaling factor  m, the cumulative logarithmic variation of
prices at time T, VT :=
qT
t=0 log(pt+1)≠ log(p0) is proportional to the sum of the Bonacich
centrality, truncated at time T, of the undirected network A˜ with weights (A2≠ I)‘ and of the
original network A with weights ‘. (see Ballester et al., 2006).
It is worth noting that the transient variations in nominal demand at a node i following a
shock mt+2i /mti = (m0i+At+2k,· ‘)/(m0i+Atk,·‘) are to a certain extent arbitrary. The transient changes
in demand are determined by the ratio between the weights of walks of di erent length leading
from the sources of the shocks to the node under consideration. This ratio is determined by
the structure of the network and can assume a wide range of value as discussed below (see
proposition 4). A foremost consequence of this remark is that a given monetary shock can
induce heterogeneous transient price response in di erent parts of the production network.
In particular, a positive monetary shock could induce negative price change in the short-run.
In what follows, we derive the behavior of the distribution of prices and the price-level in the
course of the out-of-equilibrium propagation of monetary shocks.
3.3 The dynamics of the distribution of prices
At the micro-economic level, empirical evidence suggests monetary shocks generate wrong
directional movement in some prices. For instance, Lastrapes (2006) and Balke and Wynne
(2007) find about 50% of commodity prices change in the wrong direction in response to
monetary shocks5. Our model provides an explanation of the wrong directional movement in
some prices.
Suppose a local positive shock induces an increase in the working capital of a firm i and
consequently its demand for inputs from firm j. Firm j is likely to increase its price. However
in so far as other buyers of firm j are not yet a ected by the shock, the increase price may
be less than the increase in demand by firm i. This allows firm i to purchase more inputs
and increase output. Given the local nature of the shock, the increase in output may not be
5Balke and Wynne (2007) use data on monthly changes in the components of commodities Producer Price
Index (PPI). At the highest level of disaggregation (the eight digit level) the data contains 130 time series in
1959 to 1228 time series in 2001. Lastrapes (2006) uses data of 69 commodity price indexes with complete
monthly observations from 1959:1 to 2003:10.
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matched by a corresponding rise in demand faced by firm i. And thus firm i may decrease
its price next period. The price decrease induced by the intertemporal gap between supply
and demand faced by firms propagates upstream through the supply chain, i.e. it a ects
the suppliers of the firm with a delay. Firm i’s price decrease creates a second source of
potential price anomalies: following the price decrease, the buyers of firm i can increase
their output. The process can lead to further decrease in prices if the increased output is
not matched by a corresponding increase in demand. This e ect propagates downstream in
the supply chain: from a firm to its buyers. These price anomalies progressively disappear
as the initial monetary shock di uses in the network. Over time the increase in nominal
demand becomes uniform and is matched by a corresponding general rise in prices. In the
long-run the quantitative theory of money holds. As emphasized in propositions 1 and 3,
the magnitude and the duration of the price anomalies are determined by the structure of
the network and the characteristics of the initial shock. At the micro-economic level, the
variations induced by the shock can be arbitrary. Namely, one has:
Proposition 4. For every finite sequence of prices p = (p0,p1, · · · ,pT ) œ RT+1+ such that
p1 Ø p0, there exists a network economy E(1,⁄), a monetary shock ‘ œ RN and a firm i such
that the sequence of prices of firm i in the T first periods is p.
More broadly, according to Proposition 3, the dynamics of the price distribution is
completely determined by the structure of the network.
3.4 The Price Puzzle
Numerous econometricians have reported a short run increase in the price level in response
to monetary contractions (see e.g. Hanson, 2004; Rusnak et al., 2013, and references therein).
Our model generates a rise in the price level if monetary contractions disproportionately
a ect the suppliers of consumer goods but are transmitted to consumer’s final demand with
a lag. Under these two conditions, in the short run the supply of consumer goods decreases
more than the final demand thereby generating an increase in the prices of consumer goods.
In what follows, we characterize a general class of “supply-chain” economies which generate
an increase in the price level following a contractionary monetary shock.
We define a supply-chain economy as a network economy E(A,⁄) together with a set of L
layers: {L1, · · · ,LL}. The set of layers form a partition of the set of firmsM . A firm in layer ¸
has all its suppliers in layer ¸≠1 and all its consumers in layers ¸+1 (among firms). In other
words, the adjacency matrix (restricted to firms) of the economy is upper triangular by block.
This structure is very similar to the one considered in early contributions investigating the
propagation of shocks in production networks (Bak et al., 1993; Scheinkman and Woodford,
1994; Battiston et al., 2007). We assume the household consumes goods produced by firms in
layer L. The household’s supply of labor is normalized to 1. Let k denote the share of labor
supplied to layer L at equilibrium. Assuming without loss of generality that the total wealth
is such that the price of labor is normalized to 1, one has:
k =
ÿ
iœLL
a0,im
0
i and (1≠k) =
ÿ
jœL≠L
a0,jm
0
j (23)
where L≠L denote the layers others than L.
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In this setting, suppose all firms in layer L are a ected by an homogeneous negative
monetary shock of magnitude ﬂ: the working capital of each firm i in layer L decreases to
(1≠ﬂ)m0i . One has:
Proposition 5. Assume the share of labor supplied to layer L at equilibrium is k and that
there is an homogeneous negative monetary shock of magnitude ﬂ on the firms of layer L,
then the price of firms of layer L in period 2 is given by:
p2i =
(1≠ﬂk)a0,i+1
(1≠ﬂ)a0,i pi,0. (24)
Corollary 2. Under the conditions of proposition 5, for k su ciently small, following a
negative monetary shock, all consumer prices (i.e. all prices in layer L) increase in the short
run (i.e. in period 2).
Under Corollary 2 a negative monetary shock induces a short-term increase (at least
in period 2) of the price level. Two conditions are su cient for a rise in the price level
in response to monetary contractions to emerge in the network economy. First, the shock
must be su ciently downstream (in layer L). This condition ensures a monetary contraction
generates a decrease in the supply of consumer goods. Second, firms initially a ected by the
monetary contraction must bear a su ciently low proportion of the economy’s wage bill (k
must be small enough). This condition ensures that the monetary contraction takes su ciently
long time to generate the full long run decrease in final demand. The two conditions jointly
guarantee that in the short run supply decreases more than final demand, thereby generating
an increase in the price-level in response to monetary contractions. The lower the share k of
downstream firms in the wage bill, the larger the discrepancy between the variations of final
supply and demand for consumer goods. And thus the more pronounced the rise in the price
level after a monetary contraction as highlighted in Equation 24.
4 Empirical validation of the model
4.1 Small firms in the US economy
A first empirical test of our model is to investigate whether the su cient conditions put
forward in Proposition 5 and Corollary 2 for the emergence of the price puzzle are empirically
satisfied. Thus, we empirically investigate two issues. First, whether downstream firms are
disproportionally a ected by monetary contractions. And second what is the relative share
of downstream firms in the wage bill of the US economy.
With respect to the first issue, no one has so far empirically examined the relation
between the impact of monetary shock upon a firm and its position in the production
network. However, converging empirical and theoretical evidence suggests small firms are
disproportionally a ected by monetary shocks6. Therefore, if small firms are highly represented
6For empirical evidence see Gertler and Gilchrist (1994); Gaiotti and Generale (2002); Iyer et al. (2013);
Carbo´-Valverde et al. (2016). For theoretical models see Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993); Holmstrom and
Tirole (1997); Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006)
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downstream, then downstream firms will be more hurt by monetary contractions. We assess
the validity of the first condition by analyzing the share of small firms in downstream sectors.
The Small Business Administration (SBA) provides sectoral data on the size (by sales receipts)
distribution of firms in the U.S7. In order to measure the relative share of small firms in
downstream sectors, we match the SBA data to Bureau of Economic Analysis’s data on
the sectoral composition of personal consumption expenditure (PCE)8. Firms with annual
revenues of less than a million USD account for 11.6% of the sales of basket of goods used to
compute the PCE. The share of firms with annual revenues of less than a million USD in
economy wide sales is 4.4%. Hence, small firms are disproportionately highly represented
among the producers of consumer goods. Such a pattern is also visible in more aggregate
data. Small firms play a minor role in sectors like mining and manufacturing which do
not appear in the basket of consumer goods. For instance, firms with annual receipts of
less than a million USD account for about 20% the output of Services, while their share in
Manufacturing, Mining, and Utilities is less than 2%. Figure 2 presents a direct measure
of the over representation of small firms in the basket of goods which enter the Personal
Consumption Expenditure Index (PCE) in 305 sectors. The x-axis of Figure 2 measure the
share of firms with yearly receipts of less than one million in the total receipts of a sector.
The y-axis measure the ratio of the share of a sector in PCE to its share in the economy.
The y-axis therefore captures the disproportional representation of a sector in the PCE. The
correlation coe cient between the two variables is 0.09 and Spearman’s rank correlation is
0.14. And a robust OLS line has a slope of 0.11. The positive relation between the variables
in Figure 2 suggests sectors with a high share of small firms have a disproportionately high
representation in the PCE.
With respect to the second issue, we study the share of small firms in the wage bill of
the economy using data from the Small Business Administration. Figure 3 presents the
relation between size of firms and their share in the economy’s wage bill. The y-axis presents
cumulative share in wages. The x-axis present annual receipts. Figure 3 shows that small
firms do not account for the majority of the wages in the US economy.
7Of the 1095 sectors for which SBA provides data, 644 are at the NAICS six digit level, 378 at the five
digit level, 72 at the four digit level, and 1 at the three digit level. All sectors are represented at the highest
digit level for which firm size distribution data is available
8We match sectors using the NAICS-BEA codes mapping provided by the BEA. Not all the sectoral
classification of the Input-Output are at the same NAICS digit level as the SBA size distribution. Exact
matching of NAICS codes accounts for about 78% of PCE, whereas fuzzing matching accounts for more than
99% of PCE. Fuzzy matching of NAICS follows the simple rule of matching unmatched NAICS codes from
the Input-Output table with up to 1-3 digit higher level codes.
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Figure 2: The plot marks 305 sectors. The x-axis is the log of the share of firms with receipts
of less than one million in the total receipts of a sector. The y-axis is the log of the ratio of a
sectors share in the Personal Consumption Expenditure to its share in the economy. The
shares are computed using the Input-Output table. The slope of the line in the plot is 0.105
and the intercept is -0.121. The slope and intercept are computed using robust OLS.
Figure 3: The plot marks the share of firms with di erent sizes in the wage bill of the economy.
The y-axis is the cumulative wage bill. The x-axis is the log of the annual receipts with 17
di erent sizes.
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4.2 Computational experiments on the U.S. production network
Section 3 illustrates the emergence of an increase in the price level in response to a monetary
contraction within a stylised setting. In this section, we investigate the empirical relevance of
our model by calibrating it to granular data on the US production network. Furthermore,
we extend the model to study the consequences of a more general distribution of monetary
shocks. Rather than assuming the initial impact of monetary shock falls upon firms in specific
parts of the network, we allow all firms to bear the initial impact of monetary shocks albeit
to di erent degrees. The magnitude of the initial impact of a monetary shock is inversely
correlated to the size of the firm.
4.2.1 US firm network data
We use firm-level data from S&P Capital IQ and Orbis BvD datasets to calibrate our model.
Our data set includes 105,940 buyer-seller relationships between 51,913 firms for whom we
have revenue information and NAICS codes9. While the coverage of our data set is sparse
compared to the universe of US firms, it is nevertheless the most comprehensive dataset
on supply relationships between US firms currently available. Our data set contains both
private and publicly listed firms whereas datasets used in previous studies on production
networks are limited to only contain listed firms (Atalay et al., 2011; Wu and Birge, 2014)
or aggregated input-output network (Acemoglu et al., 2012). The inclusion of a subset of
non-listed firms is relevant given the role of small firms in our explanation of the price puzzle.
Figure 4 shows our data set matches the stylized fact that the degree distribution of the
production network follows a power-law (Atalay et al., 2011; Konno, 2009). And Figure 5
shows the mid portion revenue distribution of the firms in our data set follows a power-law
like the revenue distribution of the universe of firms in the US (Axtell, 2001).
9S&P Capital IQ has a rich database about supply relationships between US firms from 2005 to 2017.
We restricted the universe of firms to private firms and publicly listed firms. We excluded banks, non-
banking financial corporations, and government entities. These restrictions left us with data on the business
relationships between 80,092 US firms. Of the 80,092 firms Capital IQ provided data on revenues and NAICS
sector codes for 43,321 firms. We used Orbis BvD to gather data on revenues or NAICS codes for 8,592 of
the 36,771 firms with missing data. Completing the Capital IQ data set with information from Orbis BvD
yielded a total of 105,940 supply relations between 51,913 firms for whom we know revenues and NAICS
sectoral codes.
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Figure 4: Degree distribution counter CDF.
Figure 5: Annual revenues.
4.2.2 The computational experiments
We calibrate the model to US firms production network by assigning the matrix of observed
supply relationships as the adjacency matrix of the network. This matrix is however un-
weighted (as Capital IQ does not collect the corresponding information). We use a taylored
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algorithm to calibrate the weights in such a way that the empirical distribution of revenues for
the firms is an invariant distribution of Equation 1410. We also calibrate the network economy
so that the households spending on di erent firms in our data set matches the sectoral
distribution of household personal consumption expenditure (PCE) in the Input-Output
table. We then set the initial value of prices, money holdings, and stocks of output to their
equilibrium values. The system is initialized in the steady state—in the sense of Proposition
2—corresponding to empirical observations about revenues and supply relationships.
We then run a series of computational experiments to investigate the dynamic response
of prices following a monetary shock. In these experiments, each time step of the model
is interpreted as a quarter on the basis of empirical observations about the frequency of
price changes. Blinder (1991) for instance finds firms change prices in response to changes
in cost and demand with the delay of a quarter. The monetary shocks considered in our
experiments are constructed as follows. A first parameter s œ [0,1] measures the aggregate
size of the shock. A second parameter ◊ œ R+ measures the heterogeneity of the shock
with respect to firms’ sizes. Let M =qiœNmi denote the total money in circulation in the
economy. A monetary contraction of size s removes sM units of money from circulation. A
monetary contraction is implemented through a reduction in the working capital of each firm
i proportional to m◊i . We focus on the case where ◊< 1 when small firms are disproportionally
a ected by monetary contractions. The case ◊ > 1 would correspond to large firms being
disproportionally a ected by the contraction. While the case ◊ = 1 corresponds to the case
where firms are homogeneously a ected by the shock and prices instantaneously adjust to
their new equilibrium value (see Corollary 1).
We run series of computational experiments with variation in the size s of the monetary
shock and the heterogeneity ◊ of the initial impact of the shock. We focus on the dynamics of
the price level measured using weights of the Personal Consumption Expenditure (PCE) from
the Input-Output Table11. The figures below summarise data from about 500 computational
experiments on the calibrated US economy with more than a million firm interactions.
Figure 6 highlights a typical response of the system following a shock in that case. In
the first time step after a monetary contraction, some prices decreases and no prices rise.
As discussed in Section 3, in the first time step after a monetary contraction some firms
experience a decrease in the demand for their goods because their buyers experienced a
decrease in working capital. The firms which experience a decrease in demand decrease the
prices of their goods. From the second time periods onward, the percolation of monetary
shocks generates an increase in the price level because the short term contraction in the
supply of consumer goods is more than the decrease in nominal final demand. The price level
is greater than the pre-shock level from the second to the seventh quarter after the monetary
contraction. The initial increase in the price level is of the same order of magnitude as the
long run decrease. The wrong directional change in the price level generated by our model is
on the same order of magnitude as that which is reported by several empirical studies Rusnak
10Estimating the network weights so that given firm sizes are the invariant distribution is a large matrix
quadratic programming problem. We solved the problem using IBM’s CPlex software.
11The price level is computed in the following manner. The sectoral weights of the Personal Consumption
Expenditure Index (PCE) are obtained from the Input-Output Table. The total weights of firms of a given
sector in the price level is set equal to the share of that sector in the PCE. The total weight of a given sector
is equally divided among firms in that sector within our data set.
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et al. (2013). It is worth noting that empirical studies on the Price Puzzle do not document
an initial decrease in the price level, which is a point of di erence with respect to the results
generated by our model. One potential reasons for this di erence is the synchronous setting of
prices within our model. Real world pricing decisions are asynchronous. Within asynchronous
pricing, the first price change of di erent firms in response to a monetary contraction will not
occur at the same time step. Therefore, the price level may not decrease in the first quarter
after a monetary contraction because some firms are into their second or greater rounds of
price change, while others are yet to change their prices.
An increase in the price level after monetary contractions systematically occurs when small
firms are disproportionally a ected by monetary contractions for su ciently low value of ◊.
The presence of the price puzzle is robust to changes in the magnitude s and the heterogeneity
of the shock ◊ (for a su ciently low value of ◊). Figure 7 illustrates the sensitivity of the
model with respect to the strength of the monetary shock by showing the relation between
the size of the monetary contraction (that is measured indirectly by the long-run change in
the price level) and the size of the short-run change of the price level in the opposite direction.
The y-axis in Figures 7 and 8 measure the percent change between the pre-shock price level
and the maximum price level in six quarters after a monetary contraction. Figure 7 shows
that the wrong directional change in the price level is of the same order of magnitude as the
long-term e ect of the monetary contraction. Figure 8 illustrates the sensitivity of the price
level response with regards to the heterogeneity of the impacts. The response is non-linear12.
The size of the price puzzle increases rapidly with the heterogeneity in initial impact of
monetary shocks (|1≠◊|). This highlights the importance of the correlation between network
structure and firm size in the propagation of monetary shocks.
12Note that in Figure 8 a monetary contraction of size s=≠0.001 does not cause a temporary increase in
the price level in the calibrated economy when ◊ > 0.97. This is simply because when ◊ is su ciently high
the decrease is supply of consumer goods is overwhelmed by the short run decrease in the nominal demand
for consumer goods for the given size of monetary contraction. The exact value of ◊ beyond which monetary
contractions will not generate an increase in the price level will depend on the size of the contraction and the
size distribution of firms within the production network.
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Figure 6: Price response to a negative monetary shock of size s=≠0.001., ◊ = 0.9.
Figure 7: Long-run versus short-run changes in the price level for ◊ = 0.95. The x-axis
corresponds to the size of the long-run (negative) price level change or equivalently to the
size s of the monetary shock. The y-axis measured the (positive) change in prices the first
quarter after a monetary contraction.
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Figure 8: Short-run price level change as a function of the heterogeneity parameter ◊ for a
fixed size of monetary shock s=≠0.001.
5 Concluding thoughts
More than 150 years ago, Thomas Tooke (1844, p. 85) observed that much of the data on the
relation between money and the price-level shows conventional wisdom “is not only not true,
but the reverse of the truth”. By conventional wisdom he meant the quantity theory of money
relation. Generations of economists since Tooke rediscovered the empirical phenomena under
various guise including the ‘Price Puzzle’ and the ‘Gibson Paradox’ (Sargent, 1973). Despite
the empirical findings, most economist did not abandoned conventional wisdom (Laidler,
1991). There are good reasons for this conservative attitude, not the least of which is the
remarkable ability of the quantity theory to explain the long run co-movements in money
and the price level (Lucas, 1996). Our paper reconciles the apparent contradiction between ‘a
positive relation between money and the price-level in the long run’ with ‘a negative relation
in the short run’. In constructing such a theory we did not resort to treating the price-level as
the independent variable and money as the dependent variable, nor did we let money and the
price-level be driven by common factors. Rather, we constructed a model in which monetary
shocks causally generate temporary wrong directional change in the price-level.
Unlike most models of monetary non-neutrality, within our model firms’ prices are fully
flexible. We introduced the production network as a mechanism for the transmission of
monetary shocks and let firm size distribution within the network influence magnitudes and
time-lags of changes in demand and supply of consumer goods. Under certain empirically
plausible conditions, a monetary contraction causes supply of consumer goods to decrease
more than demand in the short-run, thereby generating an increase in the price-level. In the
long-run, real supply of consumer goods remains unchanged and nominal demand decreases as
the economy reaches a new equilibrium with a lower price-level. Within our model the wrong
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directional movement in the price-level is an out-of-equilibrium phenomena; a monetary
contraction is disequilibrating because it hurts di erent agents to di erent degrees.
We substantiated our theoretical results with computational experiments on the US
economy. There is great scope to extend the empirical analysis. The network used in
this paper contains more firms and buyer-seller relations than hitherto available on the US
economy. But our network data is two orders of magnitude short of the empirical reality.
The US economy has more than six millions firm with employees related to each other on a
production network. Our data set therefore contains fewer than one in every hundred firms
in the US economy (Axtell, 2001). Some of the structure of production must have been
lost in the truncation. The problem is particularly pronounced in the context of arguments
developed in this paper because small firms which drive the dynamics of the price-level are
typically underrepresented in non-universal data sets of an economy’s production network13.
We hope to have presented some motivations for the collecting detailed production network
data to understand the dynamics of the price level: a variable of non-trivial significance for
the formulation of monetary policy.
13Within our setting the Input-Output table is no substitute for firm level network data. The Input-Output
Table does not contain the long supply chain linkages through which products pass from upstream producers
to retail firms. More specifically, beginning from the final consumer any sector of the Input-Output Table can
be reached within two steps. This is certainly not true of the production network between firms. Within our
data set of US firms network, some firms are up to seven steps away from the final consumer. The long chains
of flow of goods and money matter because they influence the time sequence and magnitudes of the responses
of supply and demand of consumer goods to monetary shocks, thereby shaping the behavior of the price-level.
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A Proofs
Proof: (proof of Proposition 1 ). By substituting first-order conditions for profit maximiza-
tion in the production technology of firms, one obtains for all i œM :
qi = ⁄i
Ÿ
jÂ œN
A
aj,i
piqi
pj
Baj,i
Using the fact that qjœNaj,i = 1, one can then factor out the term piqi to obtain equation 6 :
’i œM, pi = 1
⁄i
Ÿ
jœN
( pj
aj,i
)aj,i
Under the assumption that p0 = 1 and thus log(p0) = 0, this can be written in matricial forms
as:
log(p) = At|M log(p)+“ (25)
where log(p) denotes the vector (log(p1), · · · , log(pn)) œRn, At|M denotes the restriction to M
of At and for all i œM, “i :=≠ log(⁄i)≠qjœMaj,i log(aj,i).
Furthermore by combining the market clearing and the first-order conditions for profit
and utility maximization, one obtains for all i œ n, the equation
pjqj =
ÿ
iœN
aj,ipiqi
This can be written in matricial form as
pq = Apq (26)
where pq := (p0q0, · · · ,pnqn)
Given that A is aperiodic and irreducible and p0q0 is fixed, it is a standard result from
the theory of non-negative matrices that there exist a unique solution to Equation 26(see e.g.
Seneta, 2006) .
Moreover, given that for all i œM, a0,i > 0 and qjœN aj,i = 1, it is clear that the sum of
lines of At|M are all strictly less than one. It is then a standard result from the theory of
non-negative matrices that the spectral radius of At|M is strictly less than one (see e.g. Minc,
1988). This implies that (I≠At|M ) is invertible and hence that Equation 25 has a unique
solution given by:
log(p) = (I≠At|M )≠1“
Equations 25 and 26 hence determine a unique vector of outputs q œ RN and normal-
ized prices p œ RN . It is then straightforward to check that (p,q) induces a unique general
equilibrium in the sense of definition 1.
Proof: (proof of Lemma 1). Let us first show Equation 12 holds. Using Equations (8) to
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(11) sequentially yields:
pt+1i =
mt+2i
qt+1i
= m
t+2
i
fi(xti)
= m
t+2
i
fi
A
a0,imti
pt0
, · · · , an,im
t
i
ptn
B
= m
t+2
i
⁄i
r
jœN
A
aj,imti
ptj
Baj,i
Then using the fact that qjœN aj,i = 1, one gets:
pt+1i =
1
⁄i
mt+2i
mti
Ÿ
jœN
A
ptj
aj,i
Baj,i
(27)
As for 13, let us show, it holds by recursion.
• For t= 1, using the preceding condition one has
p1i =
m2i
m0i
1
⁄i
Ÿ
jœN
A
p0j
aj,i
Baj,i
Using equation 6 then yields:
p1i =
m2i
m0i
p0i
or equivalently:
log(p1i ) = log(p0i )+ log
A
m2i
m0i
B
• Let us then assume the property holds up to rank t.
One has according to Equation 27:
log(pt+1i ) =≠ log(⁄i)+ log
A
mt+2i
mti
B
+
ÿ
jœN
aj,i log(ptj)≠aj,i log(aj,i)
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Hence, by recursion:
log(pt+1i ) =≠ log(⁄i)≠
ÿ
jœN
aj,i log(aj,i)+ log
A
mt+2i
mti
B
+
ÿ
jœN
aj,i
SUlog(p0j)+ t≠1ÿ
·=0
ÿ
kœN
(A· )k,j log
A
mt+1≠·k
mt≠·≠1k
BTV
which can equivalently be written as:
log(pt+1i ) =≠ log(⁄i)≠
ÿ
jœN
aj,i log(aj,i)+
ÿ
jœN
aj,i log(p0j)+ log
A
mt+2i
mti
B
+
t≠1ÿ
·=0
ÿ
kœN
(A·+1)k,i log
A
mt+1≠·k
mt≠·≠1k
B
log(pt+1i ) =≠ log(⁄i)≠
ÿ
jœN
aj,i log(aj,i)+
ÿ
jœN
aj,i log(p0j)+
+
tÿ
·=0
ÿ
kœN
(A· )k,i log
A
mt+2≠·k
mt≠·k
B
which eventually yields using Equation 6:
log(pt+1i ) = log(p0i )+
tÿ
·=0
ÿ
kœN
(A· )k,i log
A
mt+2≠·k
mt≠·k
B
(28)
Proof: (Proposition 2). Given Assumption 1, the convergence of (mt)tœN to m and the
bound on convergence speed given by Equation (17) are straightforward consequences of existing
results about the theory of Markov chain (see e.g. Seneta, 2006; Rosenthal, 1995). Then,
one can show the convergence of log(pit) using Equation 13 and thus deduce, by continuity,
the convergence of (pt)tœN. Equation 13 then implies that the limit of (pt)tœN indeed is the
equilibrium price p. The convergence of (xt)tœN and (qt)tœN to their equilibrium values as well
as Equation 16 are then obtained by substitution in the Equations (9) and (10).
Proof: (Proposition 3). For all i œN, one can write equation 21 as:
log(pt+1i ) = log(p0i )+
tÿ
·=0
ÿ
kœN
(A· )k,i log
Qa1+ (At+2≠·k,· ≠ ›{·<t}At≠·k,· )‘
m0k+ ›{·<t}At≠·k,· ‘
Rb
A linear expansion in ‘ then yields:
log(pt+1i ) = log(p0i )+
tÿ
·=0
ÿ
kœN
(A· )k,i
QaAt+2≠·k,· ≠ ›{·<t}At≠·k,·
m0k
‘+o(‘)
Rb
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where limÎ‘Îæ0 o(‘) = 0. This yields
log(pt+1i ) = log(p0i )+
tÿ
·=0
ÿ
kœN
(AÕ)·i,k
1
m0k
1
At+2≠·k,· ≠ ›{·<t}At≠·k,·
2
‘+o(‘)
This can be written in matricial terms as
log(pt+1) = log(p0)+
tÿ
·=0
(AÕ)· m0(At+2≠· ≠ ›{·<t}At≠· )‘+o(‘)
where  m is the diagonal matrix whose coe cients are the m0k. This eventually yields:
log(pt+1) = log(p0)+
A tÿ
·=0
(AÕ)· mAt≠· (A2≠ I)‘+(AÕ)t m‘
B
+o(‘)
Proof: (Proposition 4). We consider an economy with 2S firms, where S > T +1, such that
firm 1 uses only labor in its production process, for every iØ 2 firm i uses only the output
of firm i≠1 as input and the household only consumes the output of firm 2S. Formally, it
corresponds to the adjacency matrix A= (Ai,j)i,jœN such that aj,i = ”(j,i≠1 [2S+1]) where ” is
the Kronecker symbol and [2S+1] indicates that the sum is modulo 2S+1. Explicitly:
A=
Qcccccccca
0 1 0 · · · 0
0 . . . . . . . . . ...
... . . . . . . . . . 0
0 · · · 0 . . . 1
1 0 · · · · · · 0
Rddddddddb
We shall further assume that the productivity parameter is such that ⁄i = 1 for each firm
and that the household supplies 1 unit of labor. In this framework, assuming total monetary
mass is Np0 it is clear that at the initial equilibrium all prices are equal to p0, each agent
initially holds m0i = p0 units of wealth, produces 1 unit of output using 1 unit of input and
the household provides one unit of labor and consumes one unit of good 2S.
Let us then restrict attention to vectors of shocks ‘ that a ect only the S last firms, i.e
such that for all i Æ S,‘i = 0. We shall show that this vector of shocks can be chosen such
that the induced sequence of prices for firm S is p. Indeed, in this simple setting, the price
variation of firm S are completely determined by the monetary shocks received downstream in
the supply chain whose variations induce a volatility of demand and thus of price for firm
S. The simple structure of then economy allows to derive analytically the expression of this
volatility and then to choose the sequence of shocks generating the desired price sequence.
Let us first remark that proposition 1 implies that, in our framework, one has for all iØ 1
and all t œ N :
pt+1i =
mt+2i
mti
pti≠1
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and for all tÆ T
mti =m0i +Ati,·‘= p0+ ‘i+t.
Thus, one has for all iØ 1 and all tÆ T :
pt+1i =
p0+ ‘i+t+2
p0+ ›{t>0}‘i+t
pti≠1
where ›X denotes the indicator function of the set X. Noting that ‘i = 0 for all i Æ S, a
straightforward recursion then shows that, one has for all 1Æ tÆ T :
ptS≠1 = pt≠1S
Therefore, one has for all tÆ T :
pt+1S =
p0+ ‘i+t+2
p0+ ›{t>0}‘i+t
pt≠1S
It is then straightforward to choose (‘S+2, · · · , · · ·‘S+T+1) such that
(p0S , · · · ,pTS ) = p.
This ends the proof.
Proof: (proof of proposition 5 and of the corollary). We consider that all firms in layer L
are a ected by an homogeneous negative monetary shock of magnitude ﬂ, i.e. the working
capital of each firm i in layer L is decreased to (1≠ﬂ)m0i . Then, the nominal demand of labor
of firms in layer L is reduced to qiœLL a0,i(1≠ﬂ)m0i = (1≠ﬂ)k while the demand of labor of
firms in other layers is maintained at =qjœL≠L a0,jm0j = (1≠k). Thus the supply of labor to
each firm in layer L is reduced by a factor (1≠ﬂ)/1≠ﬂk < 1 in period 1.
As firms in layer L are the only consumers of the firms of layer L≠1, their supply of inputs
is not modified by the negative shock on their nominal demand. Overall, the production of firm
i in layer L in period 1, and thus its supply in period 2 is reduced by a factor
A
1≠ﬂ
1≠ﬂk
Ba0,i
In parallel, the revenues of the household in period 1, and thus her demand in period 2, are
reduced to 1≠ﬂk
The price of a firm i in layer L in period 2 is therefore given by:
p2i =
(1≠ﬂk)ai,0A
1≠ﬂ
1≠ﬂk
Ba0,i
q0i
= (1≠ﬂk)pi,0A
1≠ﬂ
1≠ﬂk
Ba0,i = (1≠ﬂk)a0,i+1(1≠ﬂ)a0,i pi,0
where q0i is the initial production level and p0i the initial, equilibrium, price.
One then has p2i Ø p0i if and only if
(1≠ﬂk)a0,i+1
(1≠ﬂ)a0,i Ø 1 or equivalently:
a0,i+1
a0,i
<
log(1≠ﬂ)
log(1≠ﬂk) (29)
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It is then clear that Equation 29 holds as long as k is su ciently small.
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